

Salaires et globalisation depuis les années 1950/60 : diversité et convergence entre pays avancés et pays émergents/

Wages and global development since 1950/1960s: diversity and convergence between advanced and emerging countries

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Abstracts/Résumés

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Wage problematic since the 50s/Les problématiques salariales depuis les années 1950

Globalisation has effects on prices, costs and incomes and this aspect is less often discussed (see e. g. Slaughter, M, Swagel, P, "The Effect of Globalisation on Wages in the Advanced Economies", IMF WP 97/43, 1997, Gindling, T. H, Terrell, K, "Minimum Wages, Inequality and Globalization", Bonn, FZA, *Discussion Paper* n°1160, May 2004, Holz C. A, Mehrotra, A, "Wage and price dynamics in a large emerging economy: The case of China", BRI, *Working papers* n°409, April 2013. Huwart, J-Y, Verdier, L, "Does globalisation promote employment?" *Economic Globalisation: Origins and consequences*, OECD, 2013, p 88-107 etc.). Because the dimension "price / income" of globalisation is itself extremely broad (purchasing power, inflation, relative prices, terms of trade), the pre-conference and the workshop will intend to focus the analysis on *wages* that measure both price and income of the wage labor. In advanced countries, wages currently account for 40/50% of GDP and 50/70% of household incomes. Wage itself has two sides, one statistical and quantifiable, the average annual salary, the other one more psychological with the socio-cultural perception of salaries.

The project is not intended to substitute for studies already deepened f. e. by the ILO for the previous decades (1995-2010), but to give historical depth to the wage issue looking back to the years 1950 to 1960 to assess the direction and the significance of changes. The *problem* is deliberately focused on the distinction "developed countries" / "emerging countries", knowing that some "emerging" (South Korea, Singapore) have become "advanced" over time and the list of "emerging" is not closed. The workshop will try to choose examples to be representative across the planet.

The *questioning* evolves around the convergence of emerging countries with developed countries over a long period (1950/60-2010). It includes the question of socialist economies during their active phase (1950-1990). It can be broken down into three components:

1. Between 1950 and 1980, wages in advanced economies have grown faster than those of the (future) emerging countries. The situation is reversed in the 1980s: wages in emerging countries are growing faster than those of developed countries. Is it simultaneity or causality? Does the rapid growth of some emerging countries cause the slowdown of the others?

2. The labor market is not comparable to currencies, commodities or information markets and is segmented by sociocultural and emotional effects of labor and national specificities (language, labor law, social insurance). In these circumstances, can we speak of global convergence or of regional segmentation in terms of salary evolution?

3. Is this approximate convergence of wage average levels accompanied by a marginal internal equalization of wages? Or by worsening disparities due either to an expansion of qualifications or to a differential sectorial productivity growth? Three examples of disparities

will be put forward to answer the question: interstate inequality, inter-decile differences and gender wage gap

La globalisation exerce des effets sur les quantités produites et les flux commerciaux mais également sur les prix, les coûts et les revenus, Si le premier ensemble de dimensions a été étudié à travers une littérature qui compte déjà plusieurs centaines de références, le second volet est présent, mais moins souvent abordé. Les salaires représentent dans les pays avancés 50% du PIB et 70% des revenus des ménages (les salariés forment 90% des actifs) et dans les pays émergents, 35% du PIB et 40 à 50% du revenu des ménages (salariés : 50% des actifs).

Le projet vise non pas à se substituer à des études déjà très poussées du BIT, de l'OCDE ou du FMI pour la dernière décennie écoulée mais à donner de la profondeur historique et prospective à la question salariale en remontant aux années 1950/60 pour évaluer le sens et le poids des mutations. Le questionnement tourne autour des salaires en Europe dans la globalisation et peut se décliner en trois volets :

1. Les salaires européens et des pays avancés augmentent rapidement dans les années 1950-1980, puis décèlèrent fortement. Ceux des pays émergents connaissent un mouvement inverse : y a-t-il une relation de cause à effet entre les deux phénomènes ou simple simultanéité ?

2. Le « marché du travail » n'est pas comparable à celui des monnaies ou des matières premières et reste fortement lesté par des effets d'enracinement socioculturel ou socio-affectif de la main-d'œuvre et de spécificités nationales (langue parlée, droit du travail, assurances sociales). En Europe même assiste-t-on à une convergence salariale et les salaires des pays émergents convergent-ils avec ceux des pays avancés ?

3. Malgré la globalisation, les marchés du travail restent largement nationaux et les revenus salariés très disparates : quels effets exerce-t-elle sur l'évolution de ces disparités, augmentation, décréue ou stabilisation ? Trois exemples de disparités en Europe et dans les pays émergents seront mis en avant : les inégalités interétatiques, les écarts inter-déciles et le *gender wage gap*

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Analyse de l'évolution des salaires en France (1955-2008) dans le cadre d'un modèle de négociation/ Understanding wages and unemployment in France 1955 - 2008 : a bargaining model

A simple static version of the “*wage setting – price setting*” (*WS-PS*) model describing the wage bargaining between employees and firms gives a representation of the dynamics of the unemployment rate and of the hourly wage rate at the macroeconomic level, in France over the period 1955-2008. The time-varying degree of rigidity of the labor market is represented by a stochastic state variable estimated by the Kalman filter method. The reservation wage is assumed to be anchored on the legal minimum wage (*SMIC*). Others factors of wages and prices unspecified by the theory and representing the macroeconomic environment are summarized by the output gap.

According to this theoretical and methodological framework, it is shown that the reduced equation of the equilibrium rate of unemployment is made of three significant components: a *chronic* component due to the underlying factors of the repartition in the national value added (real reservation wage, social contributions, productivity, margin of companies), a *conjunctural* component depending on the output gap, and a *frictional* component due to the labor mobility and technical progress. Moreover, the social cost of unemployment explains why the observed rate of unemployment adjust gradually towards its equilibrium value.

Simultaneously, the negotiated wage rate associated to the equilibrium rate of unemployment is determined by a weighted average of the wages required by employees (equation *WS*) and those offered by employers (equation *PS*). As a result, the latter to which the observed wage rate appears to adjust, is found to depend on the reservation wage, the social contributions, the price level, the labor productivity, the margin of companies, the rate of unionization and the unemployment rate whose influence is time-varying. Our results suggest that the bargaining power of employers dominates in the average that of employees. Overall, the results confirm the relevance to distinguish four concepts of wage to reproduce reality: the wage *required* by employees that depends especially on the *reservation* wage (equation *WS*), the wage *offered* by employers (equation *PS*), the *negotiated* wage given by the confrontation between the required wage and the offered wage, and finally the *observed* wage resulting from the implementation of the negotiated labor contract.

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Wages in Spain during the Franco Dictatorship and democracy: the road we have travelled (1939-2013)/ Les salaires en Espagne pendant la dictature de Franco et la démocratie: le chemin parcouru (1939-2013)

The aim of this paper is to analyse the path followed by the Spanish economy from the end of the Civil War to the present from the perspective of the labour market in general and the evolution of wages in particular. The idea is to adopt a critical approach that seeks to shed light on a topic of current interest and which determines the well being of the population. In recent years, Spain has become one of the developed countries with the highest unemployment rates. On the other hand, international institutions (EU, IMF and OECD) have pointed to high wages and low productivity as the main causes of the labour market imbalances and the economic crisis in Spain. But, how have we reached this situation? Providing a long-term perspective, this paper has three specific objectives. First, it reconstructs the evolution of wages from a historical viewpoint, a complex task in the case of Spain (see the Appendix). Second, it analyses the role played by the labour market and workers in the Spanish growth model during the dictatorship and democracy. Third, taking the case of Spain as a reference, it aims to provide quantitative evidence of whether European integration has brought about wage convergence between the workers of different countries. To achieve these objectives, the paper is divided into five sections representing the five major stages of development of the Spanish economy since the end of the Civil War. The paper ends with a section of conclusions.

This paper aims to highlight three closely interconnected fundamental aspects. The first refers to the difficulties that exist within the Spanish statistical framework to prepare a representative series of the long-term evolution of wages in Spain. The lack of official statistics representing workers' remuneration during the dictatorship and, later, methodological changes in the series make this a difficult and unsatisfactory task. The poor historical wage statistics and the heterogeneity of the data compared with other fields seem to have been designed specifically to remove evidence of the poor treatment of workers in Spain, first during the dictatorship and then in the democracy. Furthermore, there is the representativeness of the average wage. The fact that the average wage or salary in Spain in 2013, according the National Institute of Statistics, was 1,869.1 euros has a limited interpretation: because it is a gross figure (before taxes); because it is obtained by adding all the wages in the country and dividing the result by the millions of wage earners, without taking into account the high percentage of temporary or part-time workers; because it does not

account for the high percentage of unemployed; and because the policy of austerity, with welfare cuts and an increase in indirect taxes, has also depreciated the value of wages and salaries. But, what would be the alternative? In fact, substantial pay rises have been identified during the first years of the crisis, which reflect the composition effect rather than reality. Initially, the impact on employment was concentrated in the labour market, which led to a large increase in average wages as the low wages disappeared.

The second aspect refers to the "historical difference" that Spain experienced after the Second World War, similar to Greece or Portugal. Late industrialisation plus the post-war dictatorships determined the production models and the structure of the labour market in these countries in the long term. In the case of Spain, it followed a very different path to the so-called golden age of capitalism in the Western capitalist countries. Without considering other aspects, almost forty years of dictatorship created a type of employer more concerned with political patronage and looking for governmental protection than with the competitiveness and productivity of his company. In fact, Spanish employers under the dictatorship became used to having a favourable labour framework with cheap wages and an abundant labour force. This situation enabled them to obtain high profit margins and put a brake on labour-saving innovations. The democratisation of the labour market that started in the 1970s introduced rights, freedoms and an incipient welfare state, but the passing of the years has shown that Spanish workers have only made a slight recovery in purchasing power with respect to their European counterparts at the end of the dictatorship. Moreover, successive labour reforms have permitted an increase in precarious employment and have given employers greater negotiating power than workers within a framework of high unemployment. As a result, the power of the supply side has predominated in dictatorship and democracy, although in very different contexts of rights and freedoms.

Third, the low labour productivity and high wages of Spanish workers have been demonised as the main causes of the high unemployment and low competitiveness of the Spanish economy. This idea, so common in political, business and media circles, contradicts two basic facts. First, during the entire period under study wages in Spain have been the lowest in the EU, along with Portugal and Greece. How much further do they need to be lowered? Is convergence between countries (including in living standards and welfare) not one of the objectives of the EU? Second, since the Franco dictatorship, Spanish employers have opted to specialise in labour-intensive sectors of low value added, the main competitive advantage of which has been the low cost of the workforce. Far from changing this tendency, Spain's incorporation into the EU since 1986 has perpetuated it. Labour income was sacrificed during the dictatorship and likewise under democracy. How much more does it need to be reduced? In this respect, it is absurd to criticise the Spanish economy in terms of unit labour costs in a framework of low wages, precarious employment in the low-productivity sectors that have been preferred. Third, it is very doubtful that further reductions in wages that are already low by European standards would favour competitiveness as this would have a negative effect on demand and would not necessarily entail a reduction in the final prices of goods and services, also dependent on other untouchable factors such as the markets where competition is at best dubious (electricity, for example), the rising costs of other means of production or maintaining company margins

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Solidarity Forever? Swedish Wage Levels as Index of Working Class Marginalization in post-Golden Age Scandinavia/ Solidarité pour toujours? Les niveaux de salaires en Suède comme indice de marginalisation des classes laborieuses dans la Scandinavie post/âge d'or

The public used to direct considerable attention towards the development in private sector wages. So was the case, at least, when manufacturing industries passed their apex in terms of employment – by then overwhelmingly blue-collar employment. Earned income of ordinary workers represented productive activity's translation into spending power within an equitable society. Gaps between various segments diminished.

With the formation of the globalized service and information society, focus shifted. Aided by methodological innovation and better data, social researchers now concern themselves less with the social differentiation and resource base for power that was formerly associated with collective pay structure. Instead, they study how the size of wages or salaries is cut out according to a wider set of variables, with emphasis on human capital endowment. In political discourse, preoccupation with income differentials moved away from the situation of the lower wage brackets towards the abstract, overall degree of inequality in society. Examples of relevant issues within this context are the concentration of wealth in the topmost percentile, prolonged dependency on transfer income, and the insider/outsider-split among active workers. Implicitly, everybody in stable employment under reasonable conditions of work form one single well-to-do group. Within these confines, differences in pay are facts of life due to the premium market forces set on different qualities of labour. In Scandinavia, the shift from centralized to decentralized collective settlements have facilitated greater wage dispersion today than under the heyday of solidaristic wage policies before c. 1985. This paper questions the notion that wage levels no longer indicate structural dividing lines in society but merely tell which employees get more or less money by the end of the month. Long-term development is tentatively sketched through highly aggregated descriptive statistics regarding wages of Swedish blue-collar workers in manufacturing [...]

Solidarity forever, that is. But how long is forever? Quantitatively, the traditional working class with its core in manufacturing is a dwindling group. In a knowledge-based society, the lack of pay differentiation due to different levels of formal qualification within it suggests a lack of dynamism and the existence of a strong incentive for exit from the group. The lagging behind in pay since 1990 may have more deeply rooted causes than liberal market forces gaining ground.

The social division between wage earners and salaried employees is ancient. For a time, the gap narrowed and it became imaginable that in the end it would close itself and disintegrate. Now it seems to widen again and regain its institutional importance. The mass of salaried employees by now has reached a critical level, in terms of its size and degree of attraction for newcomers to the labour market. A position in the blue-collar collective is no longer the default but a second-rate option, at least seen over the span of a lifetime. With continuous eliminations of jobs and a growing wage gap, the betterment of one's condition no longer depends on the collective efforts of a unionized work force, but on the individual worker's capacity to shift his way, typically by moving into the group of salaried employees. Following this line of thought, blue-collar workers are in a process of socio-economic marginalization in a non-peripheral economy such as Sweden. In the present exemplification, the working class is represented by its manufacturing section, which continues to hold a perfectly normal position in terms of income and status in society. Signs of marginalization are noticeable, yet inconspicuous. Other groups of workers are more exposed. Even individuals from trades and professions that normally gravitate towards salaried positions face

the threat of ending up in the so-called precariat.

The purpose of using as example a well defined, still large, reasonably well off group with considerable impact and importance handed down from the past, is to demonstrate not so much the result but the process of change – in the longer term. It is also an attempt to redirect some attention towards significant structurally defined stratifications in society, rather than focusing exclusively on *either* minor differentials within a near-perfectly competitive labour market *or* the accumulation of extreme wealth within a tiny group, at the expense of lower, middle and upper incomes considered as a whole. The fact is that the distribution of income – and thereby other resources as well – strongly depends on shifting shares across, say, quintile- or decile-defined segments of earners. What determines the outcome is partly the naked market value of their labour, but also the relative institutional, political and even discursive strength the members of the respective groups jointly possess.

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Wages in Poland between 1950 and 2005: effects of transition from planned to market economy/ Les salaires en Pologne entre 1950 et 2005: les effets de la transition de l'économie planifiée à l'économie de marché

The history of wage evolution during the postwar period in Poland is followed with respect to the political and economic changes due to the transitions from post war market economy to planned economy in the late forties and then from planned to the market economy at the beginning of nineties. The focus is put on the evolution of different systems of remuneration under different characteristics of labor market. In particular are discussed various forms of compensations when the wage is not the only source of income from labor.

Wage measuring problems are followed during the whole postwar period especially those referring to the evolution of the real purchasing power of wages in different periods of post war history. This is examined by conventional and less unconventional methods using wage purchasing power comparisons. The problem of observed and not observed inflation is analyzed in pre - and post transition periods comparing, when possible, the official real and nominal wage evolution with well being indicators of wage earners.

The structural changes in labor force remuneration and their consequences are analyzed for planned economy situation without a genuine labor market with transition and post transition period with developing market economy mechanisms and its fluctuation. The role of over employment (planned economy) and unemployment (market economy) is discussed in the context of formal and informal remuneration systems. The structural changes in the remuneration systems are observed also throughout the comparison of wage determinants in pre and post transition periods. The estimates of wage equation for both periods should confirm the higher human capital returns to education in the post transition period when compared with planned economy situation.

The comparison of human capital returns on education between Poland and France will give an idea to what extent the Polish free labor market is converging to the French labor market pattern.

Français. L'histoire de l'évolution des salaires pendant toute la période d'après guerre est suivie en parallèle avec les changements politiques et économiques provoqués par la transition de l'économie de marché vers l'économie planifiée à la sortie de la guerre à la fin des années quarante, et de l'économie planifiée à l'économie de marché au début des années 1990. On s'intéresse aux situations et caractéristiques particulières du marché du travail et

plus particulièrement aux différents systèmes de rémunération quand le salaire n'est pas la seule source du revenu de travail.

Les problèmes de mesure de salaires sont analysés pendant toute la période d'après-guerre particulièrement ceux qui concernent l'évolution de leur pouvoir d'achat en utilisant à cet effet à la fois les méthodes conventionnelles et moins conventionnelles. On rappelle le problème de l'inflation observée et non observée par les statistiques officielles dans la période pré et post transition en comparant, si possible, l'évolution officielle des salaires en nominal et en réel avec les indicateurs de bien être de salariés.

Les changements structurels dans la rémunération du travail et leurs conséquences lors du passage de l'économie planifiée (sans un vrai marché du travail) à l'économie de marché avec un marché du travail réel sont analysés. On analyse le rôle de suremploi (l'économie planifiée) avec le chômage (l'économie de marché) dans le contexte de modes de rémunérations formelles et informelles. Les changements structurels sont observés également à travers la comparaison des déterminantes de rémunération du travail dans les périodes pré et post transition. L'estimation de l'équation de salaire pour les deux périodes devrait confirmer le rendement du capital humain plus élevé dans la période post transition compare à la période de l'économie planifiée.

La comparaison du rendement du capital humain entre la France et la Pologne devrait donner une appréciation du degré de convergence des caractéristiques du marché de travail entre les deux pays.

Bas Van Leeuwen, Utrecht University, Netherlands, *Real wages since 1820, a methodological approach/ Salaires réels depuis 1820, une approche méthodologique*

The importance of wages for socio-economic circumstances, of both individual labourers and countries in general, is uncontested. Earning a high wage allows people to improve their diet, expand their consumption possibilities and enjoy more leisure time, while low wages may result in poor and monotonous diets and increased work efforts necessary for survival. Indirectly, a socially acceptable wage level may improve well being by reducing inequality and enhancing one's self-respect. Economically, high wages are argued to either increase or decrease investment in various factors of production and to stimulate increased use of technologies in the workplace.

Acknowledging this importance, many scholars have studied (real) wages, notably historians and economists. Yet, whereas the former have focussed mainly on the early modern period (e.g. Allen 2001; 2005), economists have tended to focus largely on the period after 1980 leaving a gap in the 19th and early 20th centuries. In a recent paper, published in the OECD volume "How Was Life?" we tried to remedy this issue by presenting consistent series of mean wage rates for unskilled labourers for a large number of countries between 1820 and 2008.

In this communication we will present a brief overview of the past results and, in addition, add some additional wage information we are currently in the process of collecting and standardizing.

Real wage trend of unskilled labourers

The main data, which are summarized in Table 1 [not available in this summary], give the unskilled building labourers wage expressed in a subsistence basket for one adult. It is clear that in general real wages have increased substantially over the past two centuries. While all regions show growth, real wages increased significantly more in Western Europe, the Western Offshoots and the Middle East and North Africa than in other regions; global inequality in terms of unskilled labourers' wages thus increased over these past centuries.

Even though the starting positions of all main regions were more comparable in 1820 than in 2010, there were still big differences. Roughly, one may distinguish three groups: Sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia, and Southeast Asia belonging to the poorest regions with real wages around 3.5, the Middle East and North Africa, Latin America, and Eastern Europe with values around 6.5, and Western Europe and the Western Offshoots clearly ahead with real wages between 12 and 20 times the subsistence basket. This also implied a completely different style of living: a male labourer's wage in Western Europe was able to pay ca. 12 times his daily minimum consumption. This implied that increased investment in education became possible, as well as in healthcare and industrial products, which became a driving force behind the consumer revolution.

The main remarkable feat at the start of the 19th century, however, are the very high real wages of the Western Offshoots. Allen et al. (2012), who also find high subsistence ratios for the USA, argued that the wages in the (former) settler colonies were determined by wage levels as prevailing in the metropolis. In case of Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the USA, this means wages were driven up by high wages in the UK. A second explanation might be relative prices: the price of staples – the main part of the consumption basket – was relative low in these land-abundant countries. If this is true, global convergence of staple prices in the twentieth century may account of part of the catch-up of European countries with the Western Offshoots

Besides the convergence of Western Europe and the Western Offshoots, another remarkable development is the fast increase in real wages in the Middle East and North Africa after ca. 1940s. From that point on we see that the real wages in the MENA countries grow much faster, mainly due to oil revenues, than those in Eastern Europe and Latin America, three regions that had been comparable in the 19th century. In the third group of countries, the ones that were poorest around the start of the 19th century, it is clear that only East Asia started to perform well, mainly driven by China's economic boom since the reform period in the 1970s. For sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia, however, we find that until the second half of the 20th century, wages are relatively low, allowing to purchase only between 5 and 14 times the daily consumption day. Since a worker also has to eat during days he does not work, this leaves barely enough room for sustaining a family.

[...]

Conclusion

In this communication we provide evidence on the development of real wages of unskilled labourers. This evidence largely confirms that on the growth of GDP per capita. During the first half of the 19th century, the average unskilled labourer could barely maintain a family from his wage – only in parts of Western Europe and the Western Offshoots were real wages really above 'subsistence', while in Africa they were probably below that threshold (but the number of observations is limited). In the 2000s, average real wages of unskilled workers are about 8 times the level attained at the start of the 19th century. International differences in the real wages of unskilled workers have also become much larger, with South-East Asia trailing behind and Africa catching up in recent decades. Another striking feature is that the real wage-gap between the Western Offshoots, where real wages were very high already in the 19th century, and Western Europe, where wages were much lower, closed only recently. If we go somewhat more in depth, into the relative position of labourers versus craftsmen, we find that the former's relative position improved. One reason is possibly an oversupply of skills, combined with a declining demand for craftsmen versus service workers. A second comparison is of male and female wages. Unsurprisingly, the gender wage gap closes everywhere. Yet, it closes much faster in Europe compared to elsewhere, especially East Asia. What is surprising to find, however, is the very high gender wage gaps in Europe versus other regions in the 1950s and 1960. Although perhaps to be explained in terms of welfare and

technology, it still contradicts the large literature on the European Marriage Pattern.

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Wages issue in rural/urban Russia 1880-1914 for the first globalization related to the Soviet period (1950-1991)/ Les questions salariales en Russie urbaine et rurale 1880-1914 pendant la première globalisation, mise en perspective avec la période soviétique (1950-1991)

Aomar Ibourk, Cadi Ayyad University of Marrakech, Morocco,

The inequalities of gender pay: implementation of the Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition to Moroccan data/ Les inégalités des salaires hommes-femmes: application de la décomposition Blinder-Oaxaca aux données marocaines

Les politiques économiques se retrouvent aujourd'hui dans l'obligation d'intégrer les femmes dans leurs champs d'application, dans l'objectif de se forger un modèle d'autonomisation des femmes et créer ainsi la force des marchés nationaux et mondiaux. Au Maroc, durant la dernière décennie, le statut de la femme a connu une évolution remarquable. Les femmes occupent une place centrale dans la valorisation des ressources humaines dont dispose le pays. Cependant, malgré les succès de modernisation, les progrès réalisés dans le domaine de l'éducation et la baisse des natalités, le taux de participation des femmes à l'activité économique demeure parmi les plus bas dans la région MENA.

Le taux d'activité des femmes se situe à 25,1% au niveau national en 2013 (17,5% dans les villes et 36,8% dans les zones rurales). Le faible niveau de participation des femmes sur le marché du travail a plusieurs origines : la répartition traditionnelle des rôles, la scolarisation croissante et l'allongement de leur scolarité (en milieu urbain surtout), etc., le statut matrimonial en particulier les femmes mariées. La participation active et égalitaire de la force économique majeure des femmes est une condition *sine qua non* du développement économique dans la mesure où celui-ci est tributaire de la gestion optimale de son capital humain et de l'utilisation rationnelle des ressources y compris la force du travail. C'est entre autres la raison qui pousse les autorités publiques et les milieux d'affaires à s'engouffrer dans la brèche pour mesurer l'impact des facteurs individuels, familiaux et sociaux susceptibles d'influencer le comportement des femmes sur le marché du travail.

La hausse de l'emploi salarié est une caractéristique importante de l'évolution de l'emploi durant ces dernières années. Globalement, le taux de salariat [Taux de salariat de la population active âgée de 15 ans et plus] a progressé de près de 6 points de pourcentage de 2000 à 2012, passant respectivement de 37,7% à 43,7%. Autre fait remarquable, ce rythme d'évolution de l'emploi salarié a progressé deux fois plus vite chez les hommes (+7 points) que chez les femmes (+3,5 points) durant cette période. Le travail de la femme a été depuis longtemps lié à des facteurs culturels et sociaux. Les discriminations que subissent les femmes ne concernent pas seulement sa participation au marché du travail. Une fois salariée, les femmes subissent une discrimination de sous-rémunération. Dans presque tous les pays du monde, les hommes touchent des salaires plus élevés que les femmes. Au Maroc, la discrimination salariale des hommes envers les femmes est très prononcée. Sur la base de l'Enquête Nationale sur le Niveau de Vie des Ménages, par rapport à l'ensemble des salariées, un individu de sexe masculin gagne, en moyenne 56% plus qu'une salariée féminine en 1991, 28% en 1999 et 17% en 2007. Cette discrimination salariale est flagrante dans le milieu rural puisqu'un salarié masculin touchait, en moyenne, 112% de plus qu'une salariée rurale (67% en

milieu urbain) en 1991, 89% (42% en milieu urbain) en 1999 et 37% (27% en milieu urbain) en 2007.

Evolution de la discrimination salariale entre les sexes (ratio salaire homme / salaire femme).

Milieu de résidence	1991	1999	2007
Urbain	1,67	1,42	1,27
Rural	2,12	1,89	1,37
Total	1,56	1,28	1,17

Source : HCP, enquêtes sur le niveau de vie des ménages 1990-1991, 1998-1999 et 2006-2007

En 2007, pour l'ensemble des salariés marocains, l'écart salarial observé est de 17 % en faveur des hommes. Les facteurs qui expliquent ces inégalités flagrantes entre le salaire des hommes et celui des femmes sont nombreux.

L'objectif de ce papier est d'analyser les déterminants des inégalités salariales entre les hommes et les femmes. Le travail empirique estime la fonction de gain de Mincer. Cette fonction (réduite et élargie) a pour objectif principal de mesurer les déterminants de la faible participation des femmes au marché du travail et les inégalités salariales entre les femmes et les hommes au Maroc.

Edward Kerby, London School of Economics, United Kingdom,
African manufacturing wages: Globalization and Industrialization in late apartheid South Africa/Salaires industriels africains: globalisation et industrialisation dans l'Afrique du sud de l'apartheid tardif

During the 1970's, for the first time in Africa's history, large-scale global manufacturing shifted to the industrial periphery of apartheid South Africa. Global wages competitiveness was critical in this process. Yet little is known about African manufacturing wages outside of the major urban areas, where the majority of Africans were employed in this process. Addressing this historical data shortfall, I make a contribution in three ways. Firstly, I identify new sources of African non-urban wage data from the Regional Industrial Decentralisation Programme (RIDP); secondly I collate and estimate inter-regional African manufacturing wages in the former homelands by focusing specifically on RIDP zones. Early results find a widening disparity between peri-urban and rural homeland manufacturing wages as both domestic factories and global supply chains shift to the homelands. Finally, I discuss strategies for the creation of a more complete African Wage series in the post WWII period that will benefit future research.

[...] **[Results]**

The initial results suggest three noteworthy trends, which will be discussed as broad preliminary findings to African wages in the RIDP zones. Firstly, semi-skilled manufacturing wages for Africans were substantially higher in urban areas than those in the homelands or urban periphery. Observing the base line aggregate wages in 1970 demonstrates that the Transvaal, the province in which minerals and thus industry, had a significantly higher nominal African manufacturing wage than the three other urban areas. On average, wages across this complex were 50% higher than the other urban areas. This is to be expected and has been reported in the prior literature cited above. However the second trend shows that manufacturing wages escalate across the RIDP zones. The escalation begins in the latter parts of the 1970's and show signs of a faster pace than the wages in urban areas, but not in a uniform manner. This hints at the third trend, which I think is the most important finding:

Manufacturing was being displaced from urban centres to regional RIDP zones. However a disparity between zones was emerging. To demonstrate this I will focus on the Natal /Durban /Pinetown areas where manufacturing employment shifts from the urban areas to the semi-peripheral homeland zones (Zone E in Table 1 below – not in this summary). These results are graphically represented in Map 1 & 2 [of the whole text] below and are consistent with Leibbrandt (2011). South Africa's fastest growing metropolitan area in the 1980s, both in terms of population and in terms of economic activity was Zone E. The change in wages in these RIDP zones is demonstrable of this process and provides empirical data to support these broader trends with finer spatial wage data for the homelands. RIDP zones such as Isethebe, in closer to urban areas experiences elevated employment and aggregate wages, which could demonstrate a willingness to increase manufacturing activity in closer proximity to the industrial core. The final trend is the downward change in African RIDP wages toward 1990. Two possible conclusions could be drawn from this. The first is the demise of decentralization, and steeper downturn in the economy. The second is the termination of influx control in the late 1980's. This would have allowed manufacturers to employ Africans in urban centres. Further empirical analysis is required to highlight these trends and will be discussed in the next section

[...]

[Future data collection]

Stéphane Callens, University of Artois, Arras, France,

The Union Ethics, a global approach/ L'éthique syndicale, une approche internationale

Le thème de l'éthique syndicale est très présent dans les débuts du syndicalisme. Il a été relégué au second plan avec le rejet du syndicalisme « pur » lors de la Révolution Russe de 1917. L'état de l'éthique syndicale dans le monde est dressé ici à l'aide d'une typologie des syndicalisations proposée par Pierre Rosanvallon autour de quatre groupes de pays selon leur histoire syndicale. Un premier groupe de pays est à l'exemple de l'Angleterre où les droits civiques se sont affirmés bien avant les droits sociaux et syndicaux sans remise en cause du corporatisme et d'un pouvoir syndical sur l'accès à l'emploi. Un deuxième groupe de pays (par exemple : France, États-Unis et Espagne) est dans une situation proche, mais a connu une remise en cause du corporatisme dans leur histoire syndicale. Un troisième groupe de pays, à l'exemple de l'Allemagne, a connu un développement simultané des droits civiques et syndicaux. Enfin le dernier groupe de pays est celui où il y subsiste d'importantes limitations aux droits civiques et syndicaux. Un certain nombre de dynamiques est à l'œuvre dans le mouvement syndical, des groupes d'acteurs se déterminent selon une éthique. Les contenus éthiques mobilisés ne font pas l'objet d'une unification générale et changent dans le temps. Les disparités existent selon les fédérations sectorielles dans le monde. L'étude précise une éthique syndicale positive en s'attachant à voir l'incidence de la syndicalisation sur les salaires, les procédures de recrutement, le niveau de corruption, le respect des administrateurs indépendants dans la gouvernance des organisations.

Sources : Les principales sources utilisées sont une enquête de l'Internationale de l'éducation portant sur 173 pays en 2007, et la base de données ICTWSS version 4.0 portant sur 34 pays dans la période 1960-2012.

(English)

The theme of Union Ethics is present in the beginnings of trade unionism. It was overshadowed with the rejection of "pure" trade unionism in the Russian Revolution of 1917. The state of the union ethics in the world is indicated by using a typology proposed by

Rosanvallon around four groups of countries according to their unions history. A first group of countries is as the example of England, where civil rights are asserted before the social and labor rights without questioning corporatism and union power on access to employment. A second group of countries (e.g. France, USA and Spain) is in a situation similar, but had a questioning of corporatism in their labor history. A third group of countries, like Germany, has been a simultaneous development of civil and labor rights. Finally, the last group is the country where there are still significant limitations to civil and labor rights. A number of dynamics is at work in the labor movement, groups of players are determined according to an ethic. Ethical content mobilized are not subject to a general unification and change over time. Disparities exist among sectors of trade union federations in the world. The study identifies a positive ethics focusing the impact of unionization on wages, recruitment procedures, the level of corruption, respect for independent directors in the governance of organizations.

Sources: The main sources are the Survey of the International of Education on 173 countries in 2007, and ICTWSS version 4.0 database covering 34 countries in the period 1960-2012.

Dominique Barjot, University of Paris IV Sorbonne, France,

Coût du travail et gains de productivité dans le bâtiment et les travaux publics durant les « Trente glorieuses »/ Labor costs and productivity gains in the building and public works industry during the French "thirty glorious" [1945-1975]

Dans leur célèbre ouvrage sur la croissance française de l'après-guerre paru en 1972, Carré, Dubois et Malinvaud ont bien montré que l'industrialisation française des années 1949 à 1969 s'est très largement alimentée des gains de productivité agricole, qui ont libéré d'importants effectifs de main-d'œuvre et sur un énorme effort d'investissement en logement. Si la modernisation agricole n'a pas suffi aux besoins en travailleurs de l'industrie française, comme l'atteste un appel toujours plus massif à l'immigration, cette modernisation a cependant libéré un surplus de main-d'œuvre au profit du bâtiment et des travaux publics, devenus ainsi l'une des branches de l'économie française

1/ Le BTP, branche motrice à la recherche de gains de productivité

Entre 1952 et 1972, le BTP a connu un rythme de croissance de sa valeur ajoutée supérieur à celui de l'ensemble de l'industrie et un peu inférieur à celui des branches plus dynamiques à savoir Énergie, Industrie de biens d'équipement (IBE) et Industries de biens intermédiaires (IBI). Parce que les salaires étaient nettement plus faibles que dans l'industrie, la croissance des gains de productivité du travail y a été plus lent que dans ces mêmes branches industrielles, d'où l'appel à grande échelle aux travailleurs ruraux (avant qu'ils ne passent à l'industrie comme l'a bien montré Myriam Campinos-Dubernay) et, bien sûr, étrangers, venus tant des anciens territoires de l'Empire colonial que de l'étranger (Italiens, puis Espagnols, enfin Portugais et Yougoslaves ou Turcs).

Néanmoins, la nécessité à partir de 1953 -1954 de conduire très rapidement un grand nombre de logements nouveaux a provoqué, surtout dans les années 1960, la généralisation de l'industrialisation des méthodes (préfabrication en usine, standardisation, normalisation, etc.) et donc une accélération de la substitution du capital au travail, sur le modèle déjà connu par les travaux publics. Dans ce secteur en effet la plus grande complexité des ouvrages à réaliser, la variété et le niveau de compétences requises ont engendré une mécanisation plus précoce, faisant souvent appel aux matériels américains importés et même à une américanisation des méthodes.

2/ Les travaux publics : des gains de productivité précoces et massifs, mais qui s'essoufflent

Au lendemain du Second Conflit mondial, les besoins de la reconstruction des mines et des infrastructures, mais aussi leur modernisation ont engendré une activité très forte et donc une croissance record de la production de la branche. Du fait de la pénurie de main-d'œuvre, les salaires ont beaucoup augmenté au point d'engendrer de phénomènes de concurrence avec l'industrie. Le nombre de chantiers, mais aussi leur taille ont favorisé un intense effort d'investissement en matériel, accélérée par l'inflation salariale et l'apparition des charges sociales nouvelles. Toutefois, avec l'achèvement de la reconstruction et la décolonisation, l'activité de la branche s'est progressivement ralentie obligeant les firmes à se réorienter souvent vers le bâtiment ou les activités de réseaux (routes, transports, et distribution électronique parapétroliers et à exporter vers les pays en voie de développement. C'est ainsi qu'en fin de période même dans les travaux publics, les salaires sont tombés à un niveau plutôt inférieur à ceux de l'industrie, d'où un fléchissement de l'investissement et de la substitution du capital au travail. Toutefois, les stratégies adoptées par les firmes ont varié en fonction notamment des caractéristiques spécifiques de leur activité.

3/ Dans les travaux publics, des entreprises aux stratégies très diverses

La dimension microéconomique n'est pas moins éclairante que la dimension macroéconomique, les travaux menés dans le cadre de l'INSEE autour d'une précision accrue des comptes de la nation (système intermédiaire entreprises, prix, compte stellite entreprises de la comptabilité nationale) permettent, depuis le milieu des années 70, une comparabilité entre les comptabilités d'entreprises et celle de la Nation. C'est ainsi qu'une étude a pu être menée sur deux très grandes entreprises de travaux publics : la Société générale d'Entreprises (aujourd'hui Vinci) et la Société Routière Colas (maintenant principale filiale de Bouygues).

Leader français de la profession de 1946 à 1970, spécialisée dans les grands ouvrages de génie civil et les travaux d'électrification, la première a connu une croissance de sa valeur ajoutée très similaire à celle de la branche, fourni un effort d'investissement très supérieur à la moyenne de celle-ci, tout en embauchant de façon régulière des travailleurs mieux payés que dans la moyenne de la branche. Elle a pourtant réalisé des gains de productivité du travail et globale de facteurs de production supérieurs à la moyenne de la branche BTP.

Tel n'a pas été le cas de la Société Routière Colas. Bénéficiant d'un marché en expansion formidable, surtout à partir de 1960, celui des routes, elle a choisi la voie d'une croissance extensive, associant à la fois embauches massives et investissements importants en matériels. Grâce à la supériorité technologique acquise en matière de conception et de construction des routes (émulsion de bitume à froid, soutien puis coopération avec Shell), elle n'a eu aucun problème à surmonter la contrainte de coûts, même si, surtout en fin de période, les marges bénéficiaires et la capacité d'autofinancement ont cru beaucoup moins vite que le chiffre d'affaires. Dans des conditions, le premier choc pétrolier devait, bien sûr, changer la donne.

Remi Devémy, University of Artois, France,

Trends in wage policy of the social partners in the northwest European chemical industry (and their impact on wage developments/ Les grandes tendances de la politique salariale des partenaires sociaux dans la chimie nord-ouest européenne (et leur impact sur le développement des salaires)

In the contemporary globalization, European trade unions have got to face many internal and external challenges. Following the problematic shaped by Jacques Garelo, Bertrand Lemennicier and Henri Lepage – “*Are unions helpful?*” - the study seeks to show and understand the influence of the Labor unions demands on wage growth. More than an econometric approach, it is an historical analysis focused on the chemical industry of North-West Europe in the 1960s and 1970s.

The chemical sector plays a central role in the economies of industrialized countries after World War II. It covers a wide range of activities and trades, which produce finished products and intermediate goods for other industries. In Europe, the Nord-Pas-de-Calais, Wallonia and Rhineland coalfields are the industrial heart of this branch. Between 1960 and 1980, the chemical industry changed as well in its technical foundations (oil supplanted coal) and in its business structures and strategies (international competition in the 1970s). It also turned into a white-collar industry: 30 % of employees are white-collar in 1960, 50 % twenty years later. These changes were felt differentially in the three regions of the study. While the Rhine chemistry, thanks to its powerful companies (Bayer, Henkel etc.), kept its continental domination, some economic difficulties reached the companies in the North of France and Wallonia.

Wages in the chemical industry are mainly higher than average wage. So as to compare their level, the historian needs to collect data whose quality is largely different. Thus, we can approve the differences between workers wages in the Rhine chemical industry and in the Nord-Pas-de-Calais but the gap seems to be too deep. The comparison of sector wage developments coincide moreover quite well with the economic health evolution in the regions (at constant prices + 130 % in Wallonia, + 103 % in Rhineland and + 60 % in the Nord-Pas-de-Calais between 1960 and 1980).

This different growth reveals in fact the role played by the indexation of wages established by the social partners in Belgium after the WW II. This system of adjustment was claimed by the French trade unions during the 1960s, never in West Germany. Thus, many of demands differences can be explained by the historical legacies and by the philosophical and ideological founding principles of trade unions. However, the major axes of their wage policy converged during the period: defense of the purchasing power of wages, link wage growth to business results and / or efficiency of employees, reach such an equality. It appears finally that measuring the impact of the Trade unions’ strikes on wage growth is too difficult. So we must eventually appreciate their influence in terms of their participation in social dialogue, especially at the level of the branches where they are working to ensure minimum wages.

[**French**] A l’ère de la globalisation, les syndicats européens traversent une longue période de remise en question et sont confrontés à une série de défis endogènes et exogènes. Reprenant le questionnement posé par Jacques GARELLO, Bertrand LEMENNICIER et Henri LEPAGE en 1990 – « Les syndicats sont-ils utiles ? »¹, la communication cherche à déceler et comprendre l’influence des politiques revendicatives des organisations syndicales sur la progression des salaires. Si l’approche économétrique de la question concerne en règle

¹ Jacques GARELLO, Bertrand LEMENNICIER et Henri LEPAGE, *Cinq questions sur les syndicats*, Paris : PUF, 1990, p. 59 et suivantes.

générale quelques exemples d'entreprises mises en regard², nous proposons ici une analyse historique centrée sur l'industrie chimique d'Europe du Nord-Ouest des années 1960 et 1970.

Le secteur de la chimie occupe une place centrale dans les économies des pays industrialisés après la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Il recouvre un éventail très large d'activités et, donc, de métiers, qui fabriquent aussi bien des produits finis que des biens intermédiaires pour d'autres industries. A l'échelle européenne, le cœur industriel de cette branche bat au sein du sillon minier couvrant le Nord-Pas-de-Calais, la Wallonie et la Rhénanie. Le charbon a en effet constitué pendant plusieurs décennies la matière première indispensable aux processus de synthétisation et de production. Toutefois, entre 1960 et 1980, l'industrie chimique se transforme aussi bien dans ses fondements techniques (le pétrole supprime le charbon) que dans ses structures et stratégies entrepreneuriales (concurrence internationale accrue dans les années 1970). Le secteur se tertiarise également : un salarié sur trois est un employé en 1960, un sur deux vingt ans plus tard. Ces mutations sont ressenties de façon différenciée dans les trois régions étudiées. Si la chimie rhénane, appuyée sur ses entreprises puissantes et diversifiées (Bayer, Henkel...), maintient ses assises et sa relative domination continentale, les établissements du secteur connaissent une sensible déprise dans le Nord de la France et en Wallonie.

Les salaires de la branche demeurent néanmoins globalement supérieurs à la moyenne. L'analyse comparative de leurs niveaux oblige l'historien à collecter et à traiter des données de qualité et d'origines fort variables, amenuisant la portée de la reconstitution. Ainsi, les écarts de rémunération observés entre les ouvriers rhénans et ceux du Nord-Pas-de-Calais sont compréhensibles du fait de la supériorité économique de la chimie allemande, mais leur profondeur paraît irréaliste. La comparaison des évolutions salariales du secteur coïncide en tout cas assez bien avec la santé économique de celui-ci dans les régions considérées. A prix constants, le gain des ouvriers augmente ainsi davantage en Wallonie (+ 130 %) qu'en Rhénanie-Westphalie (+ 103 %) et que dans le Nord-Pas-de-Calais (+ 60 %).

Ce différentiel laisse également apparaître le probable rôle joué par l'indexation des salaires mise en place par les partenaires sociaux dans la Belgique d'après-guerre. Ce mécanisme sera revendiqué un temps par les syndicats français, jamais en Allemagne fédérale. Il existe ainsi un certain nombre de divergences revendicatives qui s'expliquent par les héritages historiques et les fondements philosophiques et idéologiques des organisations syndicales. Forces de pression, elles se rejoignent de fait dans les grands axes de leur politique salariale : défense du pouvoir d'achat, liaison des salaires aux résultats de l'entreprise et/ou à l'efficacité des salariés, recherche d'une certaine équité dans les rémunérations. Au-delà de leurs actions revendicatives à l'efficacité difficile à mesurer, leur impact sur la progression des salaires doit s'apprécier finalement à l'aune de leur participation au dialogue social, particulièrement à l'échelon des branches où elles s'efforcent d'assurer une rémunération minimale.

² Cf. Gregg LEWIS, *Unionism and Relative Wages in the United States*, Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1963 ; Richard B. FREEMAN, James L. MEDOFF, *What do Unions do ?*, New York : Basic Books, 1984.

Jean-François Grevet, University of Artois, ESPE Lille-Nord de France, France,
*Les salaires dans l'industrie automobile internationale, un paramètre majeur de coût?
Interrogations au regard de l'histoire sur la question salariale à l'origine du succès ou
l'insuccès des trajectoires du secteur automobile à l'âge de la globalisation/ Wages in
international automobile industry, a major cost parameter to explain the success or failure in
the cars and trucks business in Global Market?*

Le papier est parti d'une interrogation nourrie par les effets de la crise économique mondiale actuelle et des discours entendus à propos de la crise traversée depuis 2008-2009 par les constructeurs automobiles du monde occidental, américains, européens et spécialement français. Ils ont fait ressurgir la question des trajectoires automobiles différentes et des modèles nationaux. Les trajectoires contrastées des groupes Alliance Renault-Nissan et Peugeot SA ou encore des géants de Détroit, Ford et General Motors ont remis à l'agenda l'importance des débats sur le niveau de salaires de rémunération dans ce secteur, concernant tant les rémunérations salariales que patronales (cf. par les débats en France sur le cas des PDG Carlos Ghosn pour Renault ou encore de Philippe Varin lors de son départ de Peugeot). En France, la référence au modèle allemand s'est notamment nourrie des succès du groupe Volkswagen et d'une image d'un Made In Germany qui aurait été revivifié par des réformes Schröder sur fond de modération salariale. En miroir, les interrogations se sont multipliées sur le modèle économique français en pleine incertitude stratégique. La stratégie du groupe Renault autour du succès imprévu du concept Logan et de la gamme Entry, dit *low cost* ont nourri le spectre de la délocalisation vers des pays émergents ou à bas coûts salariaux. Parallèlement la fermeture d'usines tels le site d'Aulnay, l'entrée dans le capital de l'entreprise familiale bicentenaire, de l'Etat et d'un groupe automobile chinois *Dongfeng Motor Corporation* ont ébranlé les certitudes d'un groupe qui aurait été trop européen et marqué par des rigidités salariales. Aux Etats-Unis, face aux succès de Toyota, les géants américains Ford et General Motors de Detroit et les organisations syndicales (*Union of Automotive Workers*) ont été mis sur la sellette pour les salaires trop élevés, tandis que disparaissaient des marques historiques comme Oldsmobile et que le Gouvernement Fédéral venait à la rescousse.

A contrario, la montée rapide des groupes de production chinois, ou encore du groupe TATA interrogent sur les raisons de la croissance, plaçant souvent l'explication de leur succès sur des bas coûts salariaux, sur des marchés en pleine croissance. L'automobile mondiale va-t-elle vers une divergence ou convergence de ces modèles de rémunérations? Un modèle de développement centré sur la modération salariale est-il un paramètre explicatif pour réussir à long terme dans l'industrie automobile à l'âge de la globalisation?

Comment comprendre le succès de groupes multinationaux comme Toyota dans le domaine du véhicule particulier ou des constructeurs allemands Daimler-Benz, BMW ou VW, ou encore suédois comme Volvo ou Scania dans le secteur des véhicules industriels, à partir de bases nationales réputées à haut niveau salarial?

Au regard de ces débats, et d'explication souvent mono-causales, il a semblé intéressant de revenir sur l'histoire automobile du demi-siècle écoulé et tenter d'historiciser la question salariale à la lumière des travaux menés au sein du GERPISA dans une longue durée pour comprendre la variété des trajectoires automobiles et des compromis productifs et salariaux expliquant le succès ou l'échec tant dans le secteur des voitures particulières que celui de productions automobile de spécialités, souvent ignorées des travaux universitaires, les véhicules industriels (camions, cars et bus).

[English]

The actual economic crisis and his effects on world automobile industry in Western countries has renewed big debates on national level about the one best way for national model

in order to survive at the global Age. For example, in France or in USA, the troubles of Alliance Renault-Nissan, Peugeot SA or American Ford and GM have provoked a debate about wages and high levels of blue-collars or CEO earnings (like the cases of Carlos Ghosn or Philippe Varin, when he left PSA). For French observers and politicians, as in the Past, the *one best way* was again the German model, and a strong « made in Germany » brand, thanks to Schroder reform and low wages and flexibility. It will be the explanation of Volkswagen success. The unpredictable success of « Logan » Concept by Renault and its « Entry » low-cost range on large world scale was a source of fear of massive relocations [« délocalisation »] from France to Eastern Europe and in Africa or Asia. The State and Chinese group introduction in Peugeot assets was the consequence of failure of old family business who would be too European model and characterized by high wages. In United States, contrasting with Toyota successes, American giants Ford and GM, rescued by federal Government, and UAW, were criticized for the high levels of earnings and poor imagination. The low level of wages on emerging potential mass-market will be the origins of growth of Chinese Automotive Group or India TATA Group. So how could we understand the success of world companies like Toyota, or German or Swedish group like Volvo or Scania if we are only focused a politics of low wages as one best way to success on long term at global Age? Convergence to similar wages level between North and South countries is it an utopia or the future of world automobile industry?

In fact, to poor and too often simple explanations, it seems interesting to come back on the recent history since the Fifties to historicize the wage problem by looking on the scholars works leaded inside the GERPISA network. The variety of automobile trajectories and wages compromises will be on the heart of explanation of success or failure in cars and less well-known commercial vehicles sectors.

Karl Lauschke, University of Bochum, Germany,

Wages and wage issues in the common speech of German Trade Unions/ Salaires et problèmes salariaux dans le discours courant des syndicats allemands

Comme leçon de l'histoire, à partir de 1948 en Allemagne des salaires conventionnels obligatoires sont négociés seulement par les partenaires sociaux : les organisations patronales d'un côté et les syndicats unifiés de l'autre représentant les salariés, sans concurrence interne aux syndicats. Leurs négociations sont autonomes, c'est-à-dire que l'État n'a pas le droit d'intervenir dans les négociations collectives (comme pendant la République de Weimar) ou de déterminer les salaires de sa propre autorité (comme pendant le régime nazi). Ce système est préservé contre des influences politiques directes et en outre très flexible car les partenaires sociaux négocient non seulement au niveau des branches professionnelles mais aussi au niveau des régions. Par là les conventions collectives peuvent réagir aux conditions particulières des secteurs économiques. En plus le dualisme dans le système de la défense des intérêts (« duales System der Interessenvertretung »), c'est-à-dire outre les négociations collectives la cogestion, permet de tenir compte des conditions individuelles des entreprises : par les conventions collectives les partenaires sociaux ne déterminent que des salaires minimum protégeant les salariés en général et les délégués du personnel sont autorisés à passer des règlements intérieurs au-dessus des salaires obligatoires selon les conditions particulières de l'entreprise y compris les relations sociales entre le patron et les salariés.

Au cours des décennies ce régime tarifaire a contribué à la stabilité du système économique allemand. Le taux de croissance du produit national brut et du salaire net se développent en conformité l'un à l'autre (voir le graphique – graphiques non disponibles dans cet abstract) en ne causant pas de graves troubles. Grâce à l'orientation générale des

syndicats, liés à aucun parti politique, en Allemagne il y a moins de grèves que dans autres pays européens.

À cause des intérêts différents et bien plus opposés, le développement économique s'accompagne de plusieurs conflits du travail mais ils n'ont jamais affaibli la capacité économique ou même menacé l'ordre économique. Après l'échec d'une réorganisation fondamentale de l'économie à la fin des années 1940 les syndicats s'accommodent de l'économie de marché. Au lieu de cela ils essaient d'améliorer le niveau de vie par la politique tarifaire, c'est-à-dire par la réduction du temps de travail et l'augmentation des salaires, en attendant de répartir la richesse de la société autrement que par cette « politique tarifaire expansive ». Les salariés bénéficient de la croissance économique depuis les années 1950 car leur salaire net monte sans cesse (voir le graphique) mais en même temps la quote-part des salaires au revenu national diminue (voir le graphique).

À cause du plein emploi au début des années 1960 cette quote-part est stagnante. Ce succès n'est pas le fait des syndicats mais des délégués du personnel. En conséquence la « dérive salariale » (« Lohndrift »), la différence entre le salaire tarifaire et le salaire effectif, monte au grand mécontentement des syndicats qui essaient de reprendre de l'influence par une « politique tarifaire d'entreprise » (« betriebsnahe Tarifpolitik »). D'un autre côté pour limiter le taux des salaires dans l'intérêt de la compétitivité internationale le gouvernement instaure un comité d'experts qui recommande chaque année une ligne directrice des salaires selon le principe de l'économiste Wilhelm Meinhold que le taux des salaires doit se composer de deux éléments : l'augmentation annuelle de la productivité et la compensation de l'inflation. Mais sous la condition d'un mouvement ouvrier se fortifiant après l'année 1968 les salariés arrivent à obtenir des augmentations exceptionnelles de salaire ; entre 1969 et 1973 il y a beaucoup de grèves sauvages (« wilde Streiks »).

L'année 1975 marque un bouleversement économique, la fin du « rêve bref d'une prospérité perpétuelle » suscitée par des changements de l'économie mondiale. Le gouvernement n'est pas capable de réaliser « le carré magique ». Face à l'inflation rapide, la stabilité des prix devient de plus en plus l'objectif prioritaire même au risque d'un chômage croissant. Le gouvernement change la direction de sa politique économique et essaie d'augmenter l'offre et de comprimer la demande en surveillant l'évolution des revenus. Malgré tous les efforts politiques faits pour ralentir la montée du chômage au début des années 1980 plus de 2 millions de personnes sont sans travail et le chômage reste à ce niveau jusqu'à la réunification en 1990 (voir le graphique). Ce développement affaiblit le mouvement syndical. Les salaires n'augmentent guère et la quote-part des salaires au revenu national descend au niveau des années 1950. Sous ces conditions défavorables les syndicats poursuivent une « politique tarifaire qualitative » (« qualitative Tarifpolitik ») au lieu d'une politique salariale, c'est-à-dire qu'ils demandent l'amélioration des conditions de travail comme les horaires de travail, l'aménagement du temps de travail, mais aussi le recyclage professionnel et la formation continue.

Sur la base des conventions correspondantes, avant tout obtenues par le syndicat des ouvriers métallurgistes dans le Bade-Wurtemberg, la région la plus importante de l'industrie d'exportation allemande, l'économie réussit à maintenir et bien plus à renforcer sa compétitivité internationale. Le taux de croissance du coût salarial unitaire diminue (voir le graphique) parallèle à la montée des exportations bien qu'il y ait d'autres facteurs en dehors du prix qui influencent la compétitivité comme la qualité des produits et des services, des produits spécialisés et un niveau technologique avancé. D'un autre côté les différences salariales entre les branches les plus compétitives et celles de moindre productivité s'agrandissent au fur et à mesure que l'ensemble des secteurs à bas salaires s'élargit à cause d'une syndicalisation faible.

In this paper I will try to address the basic questions posed by the organizers: Did globalization affect wages? And if so, how? In doing so I will give an overview of the wage question in Italy since 1945 till the early 1990s.

The first part of the period I deal with here has been characterized as the era of “embedded liberalism”, in which a sort of regulated globalization triumphed, framed by the Bretton Woods compromise and founded on the centrality of the nation state, and on the social compact between labour and capital based on wage moderation on one side and the commitment to high investment levels on the other. In this cadre, the main determinant of the wage levels was the national corporatist system of industrial relations. The space for exogenous influence, for the conditioning forces of the international market, was limited, especially if seen from the vantage point of our era of the neoliberal globalization.

Nonetheless, as the Italian case shows, even then external factors and actors played a significant role in conditioning the wage dynamics. The Italian economic establishment, in the dire conditions post 1945, viewed the vast reserve of laborious and cheap manpower as the country’s main asset. The basic idea was to take advantage from the low level of wages to conquer foreign markets. This view dominated the mental horizon of Italy’s political-economic establishment during the years leading to the “economic miracle” and persisted, *mutatis mutandis* in subsequent decades. The expansion on foreign markets appeared as the only way to recovery: in light of the poverty of the vast majority of its population, that greatly limited the potentiality of the internal market, Italy had to find its space of growth abroad, taking advantage of the low cost of labour. Thus, on the one hand, the manpower costs had to stay low, to boost the competitiveness of Italian products on foreign markets. On the other hand, the scarce purchasing power of the indigenous population due to the low wage level couldn’t help but to reinforce the mercantilist push. This was the basis of the extraordinary growth of the 1950s that climaxed in the “economic miracle” at the end of the decade.

However, in the early 1960s the stiffening of the labour market, brought about by a condition of full employment in the country’s industrial core, put into question the survival of this model. The previous conditions of accumulation were restored at mid-decade though a very restrictive monetary manoeuvre carried out by the Central Bank, which found a crucial support in the EEC. The crisis in 1964 marked a pivotal change in Italian history. The social contradictions of the “economic miracle” appeared in full light and the country’s establishment chose to respond by remaining on the path of “low consumption-low salaries-export push” rather than accepting the new realities brought about by the modernization and try to accommodate workers’ demands with a shift to a more internally oriented growth and a leap towards higher value-added productions. In this cadre the “vincolo *esterno*” (external constraint) played a crucial role in strengthening and legitimizing the deflationary front within the Italian political game. As written by the secretary of the Socialist Party and vice-president of the Council of Minister, Pietro Nenni, the message coming from the EEC Commission was: “Tax mercilessly incomes and contain wages”.

After the end of the Bretton Woods system and the beginning of the crisis of the “Keynesian” social compact in the early 1970s, for a while the external constraints ceased to operate and Italy, through devaluation and high inflation, could afford growth and substantial wage increases. The newly-acquired force of the unions and the turmoil into which the international monetary relations were mired, barred the resort to deflation as a way to counter the wage pressure. In these conditions, the price hike was the only means left to defend

profits. The force of the labour movement led to the signing, in February 1975, of an agreement between Confindustria and the trade unions on the revision of the wage indexation system (the *scala mobile*, sliding scale) that guaranteed the wages total, automatic and equal coverage against inflation.

At the end of the decade a new consensus began to consolidate inside the capitalist world, based on monetarist macroeconomics and the pre-eminence of the fight against inflation. In this context “the external lever pressing on the wage level”, in Karl Polanyi’s words, returned to play a role in the Italian political economy. The participation of the lira to the EMS was one of the main pillars of the stabilising effort of the 1980s, which in the final end resulted in a redistribution of product in favour of profits and away from wages. The nascent European Monetary System (EMS) represented a challenge for Italy, as it made inevitable a revision of the strategy followed till then, and, at the same time, gave an opportunity to consolidate the anti-inflationary front. The choice for Europe, in this case embodied by the EMS, was presented, as it would happen later, as the last chance to rescue a political and social system that seemed increasingly out of control. The participation to the EMS permitted to justify the stabilizing measures as a sacrifice for the sake of the good cause of European integration and as an unavoidable necessity to remain hooked to the European train.

Thus during the 1980s Italy realized a “monetarist stabilization”, in which the management of the economic policy was taken over by the technocratic elite of the Bank of Italy, while politics was relegated in a “residual role” of guaranteeing a sufficiently broad and stable parliamentary majority to the necessities dictated by the policy of stabilization. Though inflation reached its highest peak in 1980, in the aftermath of the second oil shock, the new anti-inflationary course of the Italian macroeconomic policy did not recede. The so called “S. Valentine decree”, emanated in 1984 by the government with the assent of the non-communist trade unions, cut the wage indexation system in order to break what was seen as a vicious circle between wage indexation and inflation. The measure attacked one of the main unions’ achievements of the 1970s and provoked the breakup of the trade unions’ unitary federation. The communist part of the CGIL and the PCI called for a referendum against the measure. Their defeat in the polls, one year later, definitely marked the opening of a new epoch. The electorate had embraced the promises of growth that the monetarist stabilization seemed to disclose.

When, in September 1992, the EMS collapsed under the weight of the policy of high interest rates followed by the Bundesbank in order to cushion the inflationary effects of the financing of the German reunification, the lira reacquired its freedom of fluctuation. By April 1993 the lira had lost almost 30% on the mark. Then the lira’s exchange rate stabilized around a level 25% lower than in the past. This permitted a sharp recovery of exports. But, again, the respite given by the devaluation was not used to obviate to the more evident weaknesses of the industrial system. To the opposite, in July 1992 the accord between Confindustria and the unions that definitively put an end to the wage indexation system and, a year later, the new agreement on the cost of labour – which linked the wage bargaining to the programmed rate of inflation – marked the definitive end of the “internal constraint” for the Italian productive system, that is the disappearance of a strong labour movement capable to oblige the employers’ to follow a strategy of growth different from the pure containment of the cost of manpower.

Kristen Sobeck, Organisation Internationale du Travail, Genève, économiste du groupe salaires, Suisse, *The ILO Global Wage Report and current wage-related debates/Le rapport mondial sur les salaires de l'OIT et les débats salariaux actuels*

Global real wage growth dropped sharply during the crisis in 2008 and 2009 and has yet to rebound to pre-crisis rates of around 3.0 per cent growth in 2006 and 2007. In recent years, this growth was driven by emerging and developing economies, where real wages have been rising – sometimes rapidly – since 2007, but with major regional variations. The rapid growth in wages in emerging and developing economies – as compared to developed economies – has narrowed the gap in average wages between the two groups of countries between 2000 and 2012. The Global Wage Report, a biennial flagship report from the International Labour Organisation, analyses the evolution of these trends around the world, giving a unique picture of wage trends and relative purchasing power globally and by region. This presentation will provide an overview of some of the main findings from the first part of 2014/15 edition of the report.

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<http://www.ilo.org/inwork>

And the site of the Global Wage Report 2014/15:

www.ilo.org/wagereport

Lorenzo Mechi, University of Padua, Italy, *Wage issues and the ILO after World War II/ Les problèmes salariaux et l'OIT après la Seconde guerre mondiale*

The ILO has paid attention to wage issues ever since its origins. The preamble of its Constitution, adopted in 1919 by the Paris peace conference, mentioned the need to ensure “the provision of an adequate living wage” as a key ingredient of social justice, which, in turn, was identified as a basic condition for peace and stability. This (as, to a certain extent, the whole creation of the ILO) was the outcome of two intertwined dynamics. On the one side, the fear of revolution induced by the Russian events in the European and American ruling classes, which stimulated a favourable disposition towards satisfying some of the workers’ movement’s claims. On the other, the fact that wages were the main component of labour costs, whose growth, by worsening the international competitiveness of goods, tended to encourage protectionism: and one of the ILO’s fundamental goals was precisely to contain this dynamic.

With this mandate, in the early 1920s the ILO started collecting a huge amount of data on wage structures and trends in different countries and on relevant aspects such as minimum wage mechanisms. An activity which was made clearly visible by the publication of several essays on these matters in the *International Labour Review*, and which represented the basis for the adoption, in 1928, of an international Convention and a Recommendation encouraging a widespread creation of minimum wage-fixing machineries, particularly in sectors and

countries where workers were less organised and collective bargaining less practiced. Not by coincidence, the adoption of these instruments followed the Geneva economic conference organised by the League of Nations in 1927, which had called for a new wave of international trade liberalisation.

Wage issues came again to the attention of the organisation at the end of WWII, in the framework of the ILO's elaboration of the general principles which should inspire the post-war world. Thus, the "Declaration concerning the aims and purposes of the ILO", adopted by the Philadelphia International Labour Conference of 1944, stressed the need to promote "policies in regard to wages and earnings, hours and other conditions of work calculated to ensure a just share of the fruits of progress to all, and a minimum living wage to all employed".

It must be said that, in those years, radical positions in wage matters were very common: at the same Philadelphia conference, for example, US Secretary of Labour Frances Perkins mentioned the opportunity of creating international minimum wage-fixing machineries on a sectoral basis. But, within a few years, with the beginning of the cold war, these positions were substituted by much more moderate ones. First of all the need to promote political stability discouraged a too-strong interference in domestic socio-economic balances, on which wage levels had a paramount influence. Secondly, the goal of social stability encouraged formulas of political compromise similar to those which had emerged in the US during the war, based on the abandonment of class struggle and a common effort to pursue economic growth, in order to feed, at the same time, salaries and profits. In this perspective, a continuous improvement of industrial productivity was the basic condition, and, as a result, the golden rule was that wage increases should never exceed gains in productivity.

In the late 1940s, the Marshall Plan actively spread these principles in Western Europe, where they inspired, amongst others, all the major international bodies of economic cooperation, such as the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) and the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). Article 68 of the ECSC Treaty, for example, stated that, except in a very few specific cases, "the national mechanisms of determination of salaries and social security (could not be) affected by the establishment of the new Community". And, in spite of its official goal to "promote the improvement of the living and working conditions (and) to make possible the equalization of such conditions in an upward direction", the ECSC High Authority always refused all actions on salaries, declaring that "it could only favour a policy of economic growth (...), which, in the long term, will bring a slow harmonisation of wages".

In principle, this attitude was shared by the ILO, where, however, the effective influence of trade unions in the decision-making process played in favour of slightly more advanced positions. Thus, in 1949 the International Labour Conference adopted a Convention and a Recommendation on the establishment of fair labour and wage conditions in public contracts, which were followed by two similar instruments aimed at protecting wages against all practices which could potentially endanger their free and full use by the recipient, such as payments in vouchers, coupons or allowances in kind.

However, these conventions and recommendations, which were adopted against the vote of the employers' representatives in the conference, represented the most "progressive" outcome of a general debate on wages which started in 1947-48 within the ILO, once again stimulated by the two "traditional" motivations of the organisation: the need to eliminate the worst forms of exploitation in order to smoothen class struggle and favour social stability, largely perceived in the early cold war years, and the desire to remove some of those elements of "unfair competition" which had always been identified as major obstacles to international trade.

Indeed, the perspective of trade liberalisation discussed at the Havana conference and within the first GATT negotiations nurtured widespread fears about competition from countries with abundant labour supply and low wages. The problem was raised, for example, during the first Asian “regional conference” of the ILO, in 1947, when a resolution invoking a quick re-admission of Japan in the Organisation was adopted, aimed at forcing its government to apply basic labour standards and thus to raise the country’s production costs. In 1953 a new regional conference stressed the need to accompany the Asian countries’ efforts to industrialise with a wage policy aimed at fairly sharing the increased prosperity resulting from economic development.

But similar problems were raised also in the European framework. Though European wages and labour costs were on average much higher than the Asian ones, they varied substantially from one country to another. This became a growing cause of concern when, in the early 1950s, projects for further economic integration started to multiply. In this perspective, the fear of a rapid shift towards a system of open competition led several economic and political circles to call for accompanying trade opening with some kind of social and wage harmonisation. Though widespread in most Western European countries, these positions were particularly popular in France, where the belief of having the highest labour costs was shared by practically all social and political forces.

The problem, debated by ILO top officials since 1953, was finally included in the agenda of the first European regional conference of the Organisation, which was held in Geneva in January-February 1955. Upon this latter’s decision, a group of high-level experts was appointed to study the issue of “social harmonisation”, and, at the same time, a committee of statisticians was created with the aim of collecting and comparing data on wages and social costs in Western Europe.

The first group, chaired by Swedish economist Bertil Ohlin, published in 1956 its famous report on *Social aspects of European economic cooperation*, which denied any need for social harmonisation as precondition for trade liberalisation, and stated that, on the contrary, international differences in the level of workers’ remuneration were indispensable in order to make the mechanism of comparative advantages work at its best. The resulting economic growth and efficiency would stimulate the progressive “upward convergence” of salaries and living standards.

The positions of the “Ohlin report”, which had a relevant influence on the EEC negotiations and contributed to inspire the Rome Treaty, were reaffirmed the following year by the report of the second committee. This latter confirmed the considerable differences existing between the European wage levels and structures, incidentally showing that France really was the country with the highest labour cost per hour, but it also stressed that “differences in the general level of labour cost among countries need not constitute a serious problem in international trade”, since, “even where such differences are not offset by differences in other costs or in productivity, cost differences between economies can be modified through exchange rate adjustments”.

Felix Römer, German Historical Institute London, Great-Britain, *The Measurement of Income Distribution and Concepts of Inequality in Britain and West Germany during the Post-war Era/ La mesure de la distribution des revenus et les concepts d'inégalités en Grande-Bretagne et en Allemagne de l'Ouest dans la période d'après-guerre*

The paper will explore the tension between divergence and convergence in the field of wages and incomes in post-war Europe by comparing the history of income statistics in Great Britain and West Germany after the Second World War. It will trace how economists and statisticians in the two countries conceptualized the analysis of income and wealth distribution during the post-war era. The analysis will reveal that scholars in both countries pursued markedly different approaches, until international standardization led to the harmonization of the underlying theories by the late 1960s and early 1970s. From early on British statisticians understood income inequality primarily as a socio-political issue, whereas their German counterparts thought of income distribution first and foremost as a macroeconomic problem. In terms of methodological approaches, British statisticians followed the personal distribution theory, based on the notion of a society characterized by gradually differentiated inequality. Meanwhile, German statisticians relied on the functional distribution theory, which focused on the respective shares of employees and employers, implying a dualistic, class-based notion of society. The paper will also explore how the academic categories and theories underlying these differing approaches structured and influenced political debates on social inequality – this will demonstrate the interdependence of scientific and societal discourse on wages and income during the post-war era. It was not until the 1970s that international standardization in the field of income statistics brought about increasing convergence both in economic theories and political languages on economic inequality in both countries.

Laurent Warlouzet, University of Artois, France, *Foreign economic policy of the EEC, 1973-1986, and commercial protection against low-wage countries/ La politique économique extérieure de la CEE, 1973-1986, et les protections commerciales vis-à-vis des pays à bas salaires*

The 1970s has been described as the “shock of the global” for Western Europe³. The internationalisation of economies became a daunting challenge after the tenfold rise in oil prices, but also because of rising competition from non-Atlantic countries. Japan was followed in the 1970s by the four Tigers (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong-Kong and Singapore). These countries benefited from low wages combined with efficient export-led industrial policies. In Western Europe, the threat materialized in the 1970s especially in the traditional economic sectors, like textile, steel and shipbuilding. All of these branches still employed hundred of thousands of workers in the 1970s, the majority of whom were being made redundant between the oil shock of 1973 and the counter-oil shock of 1986.

The main question arising from this dramatic outlook is the reaction of western European actors in front of this industrial development from low-wages countries. The two extremes were on the one hand free-market policies designed to open up the market and to replace the lost jobs with new ones in other sectors, and on the other hand protectionist policies aimed at preserving the traditional European industrial capacities.

³ Niall Ferguson, Charles S. Maier, Erez Manela, Daniel J. Sargent (ed.), *The Shock of the Global. The 1970s in perspective*, Cambridge, Harvard UP, 2010, 434 p.

In Western Europe, the major countries accepted to coordinate –to some extent– their international economic policies within the framework of the European Economic Community (EEC) set up in 1957. As a result, a second question arising from this challenge relates to the level of governance: did western European actors choose to live up to this challenge through the EEC, via other international institutions (like the GATT, etc.), or simply by purely national measures?

These two questions – in terms of economic policy and in terms of level of governance – will be examined through archives of four main actors: the European Commission and the national governments of France, West Germany and the United Kingdom.

The first part will delve into the abortive attempts of a global response. There was no possibility for Western European countries to force these new competitors to adopt higher wage. In the context of the “New Economic Order” proclaimed in 1973 by the “third-world” countries grouped in the framework of the UNCTAD (United Nations Conference for Trade and Development), it was morally and politically impossible to prevent these poorer countries to use their competitive edge to create growth.

As a result, the main tool available for western European countries was international commercial policy. This was part of the EEC competences so the counter-offensive took place at this level. It was the European Commission who negotiated on behalf of the nine (and then ten⁴) member-states within the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade). The EEC had a large competence in terms of commercial policy, namely the determination of custom duties, quotas and countervailing measures. These tools were the most important to compensate the low level of wages in Japan and in the Tigers. However, most member-states’s officials insisted on keeping the EEC commitment to free-market even in the midst of the economic crisis of the 1970s. The counter-example of the protectionist wave of the 1930s loomed large in most decision-makers’ mind. That’s why the GATT Tokyo Round (1973-1979) continued the pace of international liberalization of trade⁵.

The second part of the paper will deal with the other answer, namely the sector-by-sector approach. The major example was the steel industry. Between 1977 and the mid-1980s, the EEC countries decided to closely coordinate their industrial policy in steel: severe restructuring involving the laying off of dozens of thousands of workers were combined with a monitoring of state aids, and specific protectionist measures. The latter were generally adopted following an anti-dumping procedure. They targeted Japanese as well as American imports on a case-by-case basis (concerning only specific products and for short period of time).

In textile, the approach combined severe restructuring (albeit with less state intervention), the monitoring of state aids, and protectionist measures. However, the latter were more comprehensive as they were embedded in so-called “Multi-Fibres agreement” (MFA). These international frameworks organized trade in textile since 1973. They established an exception to the GATT rules of free-trade by allowing temporary protection for European textile firms, in order to give them a breathing space to restructure. This protection was then progressively lifted.

⁴ The EEC was enlarged to nine countries in 1973: Belgium, Denmark, France, West Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, the UK. Greece joined in 1981.

⁵ Lucia Coppolaro, GATT, « Inflation and exchange-rate instability: liberalizing trade in the Tokyo Round negotiations (1973-1979) », in Michel-Pierre Chélini and Laurent Warloutzet (eds.), *Slowing prices down: Adaptation of States and European Economical Actors to the Inflationary Fever in the 1970s*, Paris, Presses de Sciences-Po, to be published.

In shipbuilding, the EEC approach did not work, in particular because there was a competition between three international institutions of regulations, the EEC, the GATT and the OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development). The latter was seen as the natural forum to discuss shipbuilding. However Japan belonged to the OECD but not South Korea, which emerged as a serious competitor (even for Japanese firms) around 1980. This seriously complicated any attempt of international regulation.

In all three cases, the answer to the development of a competitive industrial basis in certain low-wage countries was a combination of specific protectionist measures with an industrial policy of competitiveness. From an institutional point of view, the couple EEC-GATT emerged as the most serious forum of international regulation. This institutional couple had always been committed to free-trade, even at the peak of the crisis, from 1973 to 1986. In 1986, the opening up of a new round of talks, the Uruguay Round, confirmed this free-trade orientation.